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Want: a perfect, stable matching Ø Match each man to a unique woman such that no pair of man woman and prefer each other to their current matches (such a pair is called a "blocking pair") Each man lists women in order of preference from best to worst.
PPT Stable Matching Examples PowerPoint Presentation, free download ID298255 Theorem 4.16 (Roth) Suppose each man chooses his dominant strategy and states his true preferences, and the women choose any set of strategies (preference lists) P'(w) that form an equilibrium for the matching game induced by the M-optimal stable mechanism. Looking at the document Fundamentals of Computing Series, The Stable Marriage Problem Each man lists women in order of preference from best to worst.
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